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Summary
Background The eﬀ ects of political regimes on health are unclear because empirical evidence is neither strong nor 
robust. Traditional econometric tools do not allow the direction of causality to be established clearly. We used a new 
method to investigate whether political transition into democracy aﬀ ected child mortality.
Methods We used a synthetic control method to assess the eﬀ ects of democratisation on child mortality as a proxy of 
health in countries that underwent transition from autocracy to democracy that lasted for at least 10 years between 
1960 and 2010. Democracy was indicated by a score greater than 0 in the Polity2 index. We constructed synthetic 
controls (counterfactuals) based on weighted averages for factors such as child mortality, economic development, 
openess to trade, conﬂ ict, rural population, and female education from a pool of countries that remained autocracies 
during the study period.
Results Of 60 countries that underwent democratic transition in the study period, 33 met our inclusion criteria. We 
were able to construct good counterfactuals for 24 of these. On average, democratisation reduced child mortality, and 
the eﬀ ect increased over time. Signiﬁ cant reductions in child mortality were seen in nine (38%) countries, with the 
average reduction 10 years after democratisation being 13%. In the other 15 countries the eﬀ ects were not signiﬁ cant. 
At the country level yhe eﬀ ects were heterogeneous, but the diﬀ erences did not correlate with geographic, economic, 
or political indicators. The eﬀ ect of democratisation, however, was stronger in countries with above average child 
mortality before transition than in countries with below average child mortality.
Interpretation Our results are consistent with the interpretation that democratic reforms have the greatest eﬀ ects 
when child mortality is a direct concern for a large part of the population. Future research could focus on identifying 
the precise mechanism through which the eﬀ ects emerge. 
Funding European Union 7th Framework Programme and KU Leuven Methusalem Fund.
Copyright © The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license.
Introduction
The eﬀ ects of political regimes on health are unclear. 
Democracy is argued to be good for health because it 
gives the poor a stronger voice in political decision-
making than other regimes, leading to improved public 
health policies, or because it stimulates economic growth 
and, therefore, income and health.1,2 Not everybody, 
however, agrees that democratisation necessarily 
improves people’s health.3 The empirical evidence is 
neither strong nor robust4 and establishing causality is 
diﬃ  cult.5,6
Few studies have quantitatively assessed the eﬀ ects of 
democracy on health. Besley and Kudamatsu,4 and Franco 
and colleagues7 have reported positive correlations between 
democracy and health indicators, such as life expectancy 
and mortality, with global data.2,7,8 Alvarez-Dardet and 
Franco-Giraldo9 also showed a positive relation between 
democracy and health in postcommunist countries, with 
the fall of the Berlin Wall used as a natural experiment. By 
contrast, Ross8 found no signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect of democracy on 
child mortality in a global dataset.
Causality is unclear because health and prosperity 
might themselves aﬀ ect political systems, and both could 
be aﬀ ected by other factors. In one study by Kudamatsu,10 
who used panel data from various African countries, 
causality is clearer. He showed an association between 
democratic transition and reduced infant mortality, 
although the analysis was limited to a few countries from 
one continent and generalisation of the results should be 
viewed with caution.
We used a new method to assess data from multiple 
countries and diﬀ erent continents and investigate the 
eﬀ ects of democratic reforms on health, represented by 
child mortality. The synthetic control method (SCM) 
developed by Abadie and colleagues,11,12 allows 
identiﬁ cation of heterogeneity and causality in health 
eﬀ ects related to democratisation, unlike traditional 
statistical methods. We used the SCM to assess the 
health eﬀ ects of 33 democratic reforms between 1960 
and 2010.
Methods
Synthetic control method
SCM allows estimation of the eﬀ ect of an event, termed 
the treatment, within a country, despite the fact that the 
counterfactual for the treated country is not observed. 
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Mortality Estimation see 
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In the case of this study, the treatments are democratic 
transitions. SCM allows comparison of child mortality in 
a treated country before and after political reform with 
the weighted average child mortality constructed from a 
pool of countries without political reform.12 The weights 
are calculated such that the synthetic control resembles 
the characteristics of the treated country before the regime 
change. The SCM minimises the distance between the 
vector of characteristics of the treated country and that of 
the synthetic control before treatment.
The use of the SCM is an improvement on other 
parametric and semiparametric estimators for several 
reasons: the characteristics before treatment between the 
treated country and its counterfactual ﬁ t in a transparent 
way; its selection of potential control countries is ﬂ exible; 
and the method implies weaker identiﬁ cation 
assumptions than traditional estimation techniques, 
which also provides ﬂ exibility.13 Additionally, this method 
allows exclusion of observations for which it is not 
possible to build a proper counterfactual, as the inclusion 
of these countries would lead to biased results.13 Through 
combining the properties of large cross-country studies, 
which often lack internal validity, and case studies, the 
ﬁ ndings of which often cannot be generalised, the SCM 
estimator gains external and internal validity.13
A limitation of the method is that standard inference 
techniques are not suitable to assess the signiﬁ cance of 
the results because the number of permanent regimes in 
the control group is small. Abadie and colleagues, 
therefore, suggested the use of a placebo test12 to compute 
p values in order to assesses whether the eﬀ ect of political 
reform on child mortality in the treated country is larger 
than that if the political reform is randomly assigned to a 
country in the control group. Furthermore, as suggested 
by Cavallo and colleagues,14 we extended the method to 
compute an average treatment eﬀ ect that we used to 
estimate the average eﬀ ect and joint signiﬁ cance of the 
treatments in diﬀ erent countries compared with any 
potential combination of placebo eﬀ ects.13
Main indicators
We used panel data to calculate annual indicators for health 
and political reforms in Asian, African, and Latin American 
countries from 1960 to 2010. The political reform indicator 
is based on the Polity2 index from the Polity IV database,15 
and has been used in several other studies on political 
reforms.16–19 The Polity2 index ranges from –10 to 10. A 
country is classiﬁ ed as a democracy when the Polity2 value 
is greater than 0, with higher values indicating an 
increasing degree of democracy, and otherwise is classiﬁ ed 
as an autocracy. The threshold of 0 corresponds to a broad 
deﬁ nition of democracy, but as stressed by Persson and 
Tabellini,16 it captures many large changes in the Polity2 
index that are clustered around 0. We used two additional 
criteria for political reform. First, as it might take several 
years before political transition aﬀ ects health, we only 
included transitions that lasted at least 10 years in the 
treated sample. Second, the sample of treated countries 
had to have at least 10 years of observations under autocracy 
before the democratic transition.
Child mortality was used as indicator of health, and was 
measured as the number of children who died before age 
5 years per 1000 livebirths. This factor is a good indicator of 
overall health because 20% of all deaths occur before this 
age.20 We used data from the UN Inter-agency Group for 
Child Mortality Estimation. To test whether the eﬀ ect of 
democratic reforms is stronger in countries with higher 
child mortality, we compared countries with above average 
and those with below average child mortality in the year of 
the reform.
Research in context
Evidence before this study
Between September, 2011, and December, 2015, we regularly 
searched for published papers in Google Scholar and JSTOR, 
with the terms “health” and “democracy”. We found only a few 
studies that have empirically assessed the relations between 
democracy and health. The evidence on a causal eﬀ ect is neither 
strong nor robust. One study did not ﬁ nd a signiﬁ cant 
correlation between democracy and child mortality, whereas 
three others showed positive relations between democracy and 
health indicators. None of these studies, however, could 
demonstrate causality. Another study showed a causal eﬀ ect of 
democratisation on health by using retrospective fertility 
surveys for a subset of African countries.
Added value of this study
In this study we have used a new method, the synthetic control 
method, and used data from a large set of countries to assess 
the causal eﬀ ects of democratisation on health, assigned as 
child mortality. We found important heterogeneity in the 
eﬀ ects of democratic transition between countries, with eﬀ ects 
being signiﬁ cant in 40% and non-signiﬁ cant in the others, 
although none had an increase in child mortality. The diﬀ erence 
in eﬀ ects did not correlate with geographic, economic, or 
political indicators, but in countries with initial child mortality 
higher than average, the eﬀ ect was greater than in countries 
where it was lower than average.
Implications of all the available evidence
A political transition into democracy reduces child mortality on 
average, but the results are heterogeneous across countries. 
This diﬀ erence might explain why results have varied in 
previous studies. The health situation before democratisation 
seems to be a factor in the eﬀ ects afterwards. Reforms that 
improve the political power of the poor might, therefore, be 
particularly important when health problems are severe. 
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Control variables
To construct the synthetic controls, we included 
variables that have been shown in previous studies to 
capture factors other than democratic transition likely to 
aﬀ ect the prevalence of child mortality. Economic 
development (real gross domestic product per person21) 
aﬀ ects child health because of the amount it allows 
governments to spend on health and sanitation facilities, 
education, and so on. The share of the rural population 
captures the fact that providing such public goods in 
rural areas is more diﬃ  cult than in urban areas,22 and 
that the highest proportion of poor people live in remote 
areas where availability and access to health 
infrastructure is limited.8
Female education (in particular for mothers), measured 
as the percentage of female children who have completed 
the last year of primary school or higher,23 can be an 
important factor in children’s health.24 A country’s 
openness to trade21 might increase income, immunisation 
rates, and public health spending.25 Shocks, such as 
conﬂ icts and wars,26 can have a direct eﬀ ect on child 
mortality, but also indirect eﬀ ects, for instance through 
reduced access to food. Thus, as suggested by 
Kudamatsu,10 we deﬁ ned conﬂ ict as a dummy that is 
equal to 1 if the country was involved in a conﬂ ict with 
more than 1000 deaths. Population growth21 was also 
included as a control. Finally, we included child mortality 
in the year of the reform and in the 5 and 10 years before 
the democratic transition.
Statistical analysis
The SCM allows estimation of the overall ﬁ t of the 
selected synthetic control in comparison with that of the 
treated unit by measuring the root mean square 
prediction error. Values of 3 or lower show a good ﬁ t 
between the treated unit and the synthetic control. We 
excluded countries with values higher than 3. To test the 
robustness of our results, we repeated the analysis with 
a shorter treatment period (democracy lasting 6 years) 
and using a diﬀ erent indicator for the political transitions 
(Cheibub-Gandhi-Vreeland indicator27).
We calculated p values for aggregated eﬀ ects by 
considering the ratio between the number of any 
potential average placebo eﬀ ect showing an eﬀ ect 
higher than the aggregation of the actual treated 
countries, and the total number of potential average 
aggregation of placebo eﬀ ects.14 The statistical analyses 
were done with Stata (version 13) and Matlab 
(version 2015). 
Role of the funding source
The funder of the study had no role in the study design, 
data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, 
or writing of the report. The corresponding author 
had full access to all the data in the study and had 
ﬁ nal responsibility for the decision to submit for 
publication. 
Results
Of 60 countries that underwent democratic transition 
between 1960 and 2010, 33 met our inclusion criteria. 
The control pool consisted of 29 permanent autocracies. 
From the control pool we were able to construct good 
counterfactuals for 24 of the 33 treated countries.
Child mortality declined over time, with the average 
falling from 154 to 65 children per 1000 livebirths (change 
58%). Average child mortality diﬀ ered between political 
regimes, being 35% higher in autocratic regimes than in 
democracies (table 1). Child mortality in the 24 countries 
with good counterfactuals changed from being very close 
Full sample Democracy Autocracy
1970–79 153·8 143·3 157·7
1980–89 117·3 89·6 124·6
1990–99 90·4 86·1 97·7
2000–09 64·8 65·1 64·5
Data are simple unweighted averages across political regimes for the 33 treated 
countries and 29 controls in the sample. The samples vary over time due to entry 
into and  exit from democracy.
Table 1: Average number of child deaths per 1000 livebirths by decade 
and political regime
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Figure 1: Average eﬀ ects of democratisation on child mortality
(A) 24 countries with good synthetic controls. (B) Nine countries in which the 
eﬀ ect was signiﬁ cant . The estimated eﬀ ects were normalised by setting child 
mortality equal to 1 in the year of the reform.
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before democratic transition to being an average of 5% 
lower in the treated countries 10 years after transition 
(p=0⋅001, ﬁ gure 1). The eﬀ ect was signiﬁ cant within the 
10% threshold in nine (38%) of the 24 countries. Changes 
after democratisation were not signiﬁ cant in 15 (63%) 
countries, but no country had a signiﬁ cant increase in 
child mortality (table 2). The diﬀ erence between treated 
countries and controls after democratisation grew over 
time. In those countries with signiﬁ cant changes, 5 years 
after the transition started the mean diﬀ erence was 8% 
(p<0⋅001) and after 10 years it was 13% (p<0⋅0001).
When we assessed democratisation that lasted for at 
least 6 years, we could construct good counterfactuals for 
28 treated countries. Ten (36%) countries showed 
signiﬁ cant reductions in child mortality after 6 years, 
18 (64%) countries had changes that were not signiﬁ cant, 
and no country had a signiﬁ cant increase in child 
mortality. The overall average reduction in child mortality 
after 6 years was 3% (p=0⋅0054), and for the countries 
with a signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect the mean reduction was 10% 
(p<0⋅0001, appendix). The treatment eﬀ ects were lower 
than in the original model, in line with the increasing 
eﬀ ect of democratisation over time.
With use of the Cheibub-Gandhi-Vreeland indicator for 
political transition, the years of the transition in some 
countries diﬀ ered from the years assigned by Polity2, 
and four that were shown by Polity2 to have undergone 
transition were reclassiﬁ ed as having no transition. We 
were able to construct good counterfactuals for 25 treated 
countries, of which nine (36%) showed signiﬁ cant 
reductions in child mortality and 16 (64%) had changes 
that were not signiﬁ cant. None had a signiﬁ cant increase. 
10 years after democratisation, child mortality was a 
mean of 5% lower in treated countries than in the 
synthetic controls (p=0⋅0071), and in countries with 
signiﬁ cant eﬀ ects the average diﬀ erence was 16% 
(p<0⋅0001, appendix). These eﬀ ects are similar to, or 
possibly stronger than, those with the Polity2 indicator.
The mean treatment eﬀ ect was substantially greater for 
countries that had child mortality above average in the 
year of transition than in countries where child mortality 
was below average (ﬁ gure 2). 
Discussion
Our analysis of 33 democratic transitions in the past four 
decades suggests that, on average, political reforms 
reduce child mortality and that the eﬀ ect increases over 
time. The results were shown to be robust by the use of 
diﬀ erent time periods for democracy and diﬀ erent 
political indicators. The increasing decline in child 
mortality over time is consistent with the argument that it 
takes time to change health policies and see the eﬀ ects. 
We noted that at the country level, the eﬀ ect is highly 
heterogeneous. The 10-year democratisation eﬀ ect 
ranged from a reduction of 39% to an increase, albeit not 
signiﬁ cant, of 18%.
Whether there are structural diﬀ erences between the 
groups of countries with and without signiﬁ cant eﬀ ects 
would be of interest to assess. We saw no clear regional 
diﬀ erences: the nine countries for which there was 
signiﬁ cant improvements in child mortality are in Africa 
(Nigeria and Senegal), Asia (Bangladesh and 
Philippines), and Latin America (Bolivia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico). Political situation 
See Online for appendix
Eﬀ ect 
after 
10 years
Eﬀ ect 
after 
5 years
Child 
mortality* 
at year of 
reform
RMSPE Average 
p value 
after 
10 years
Senegal –39% –21% 139 2·1 <0·001
Philippines –21% –15% 72·2 1·8 <0·001
Bangladesh –21% –14% 137·7 3·0 <0·001
Nicaragua –18% –9% 66·1 0·5 0·02
Peru –16% –2% 126·2 0·6 0·650
Guatemala –15% –7% 96·9 0·1 <0·001
Ecuador –15% –7% 97·7 0·2 0·18
Bolivia –15% –5% 160·3 0·2 <0·001
Mongolia –15% –6% 106·6 0·7 0·13
Mexico –11% –6% 36·9 0·1 <0·001
Honduras –10% –4% 94·7 0·2 <0·001
Brazil –8% 0% 75·4 0·4 0·43
Nigeria –8% –8% 209·5 1·9 0·08
El Salvador –7% –3% 97·2 0·7 0·23
Djibouti –5% –1% 109·4 0·3 0·60
Dominican Republic –4% 1% 93·4 0·3 0·60
Cape Verde –1% 1% 59·1 0·1 0·23
Indonesia 0% 0% 54·9 0·1 0·30
Chile 0% –6% 20·4 1·1 0·38
Pakistan 2% 0% 143·3 0·9 0·47
Paraguay 4% –1% 47·2 0·3 0·44
Ghana 12% 6% 111·6 1·4 0·79
Guyana 16% 1% 56·8 0·3 0·63
Panama 18% 6% 32·6 0·2 1·00
*Number of child deaths per 1000 livebirths. RMSPE=root mean square prediction 
error.
Table 2: Eﬀ ects of democratic transition on child mortality in 
24 countries, compared with synthetic controls 
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Figure 2: Average treatment eﬀ ect for countries with child mortality above 
and below average in the year of democratisation, compared with synthetic 
control
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(according to the Polity2 index) and economic status also 
did not diﬀ er between countries with and without 
signiﬁ cant changes in child mortality at the time 
of transition.
When assessed in the year of the reform, child 
mortality was on average almost 35% higher in the 
countries with signiﬁ cant changes in child mortality 
than in those where the changes were not signiﬁ cant. 
This diﬀ erence supports the theory that democratic 
reforms have stronger eﬀ ects in countries with high and 
very high child mortality in the year of transition and 
less impact when child mortality is already low. 
Democratisation reduced child mortality by an average 
of 9% 10 years after transition in countries with child 
mortality above average in the year of transition, 
compared with synthetic controls. 10 years after 
transition, the average reduction in child mortality of 
only 2% in countries with below average child mortality 
in the year of democratic transmission suggests that 
democratic reforms have the greatest eﬀ ects when 
health is an important concern for a larger part of the 
population. Thus, democratisation might have eﬀ ects 
through improved health policies, which beneﬁ ts the 
poorest people, whose political power is increased by the 
regime change.9 Another potential explanation is that 
democratisation stimulates economic growth,28 which 
enhances the eﬀ ects on health in the poorest countries.29 
These two mechanisms might also reinforce one other, 
although our data and method cannot disentangle these 
mechanisms. We have done regression analyses 
(unpublished) which suggest that both factors play a 
role, but causality remains diﬃ  cult to identify.
Our analysis has limitations. First, as for other studies, 
the external validity is limited by using aggregate health 
data. Of 60 democratic transitions in the observed 
period, only 33 satisﬁ ed the SCM properties. Second, 
there is a trade-oﬀ  between the length of the 
pretreatment period and the number of usable 
experiments; the SCM controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity better with longer pretreatment periods. 
To optimise our results, we used a minimum of 10 years 
before democratic transition and only used countries 
that had very good pretreatment ﬁ t with synthetic 
controls. Third, the eﬀ ects of democratic reform might 
depend on the ideology of the autocratic government, 
but there are no data on ideologies of such regimes and, 
therefore, we were unable to control for this factor. 
Despite these limitations, the causal eﬀ ects and 
correlations identiﬁ ed in our analysis are robust across 
diﬀ erent speciﬁ cations and tests. We did not use life 
expectancy because the reductions in mortality occur in 
very diﬀ erent age groups between rich and poor 
countries, making it unsuitable to assess population 
health in countries with diﬀ erent incomes and health 
levels.30 In summary, our analysis shows that political 
regime changes do sometimes aﬀ ect health, but not 
always. Although our method provides evidence on the 
causality of the eﬀ ects, it cannot identify the precise 
causal mechanism. Our results are consistent with the 
interpretation that democratic reforms have the greatest 
eﬀ ects when child mortality is a direct concern for a 
large part of the population. Future research could focus 
on identifying the mechanisms through which the 
eﬀ ects emerge.
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